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THE PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION ACT OF I947
Ruth C. Silva*

I
HISTORY OF PRESIDENTIAL SuccESSION LEGISLATION

A. Law of r792
HE Constitution of the United States empowers the Congress to
designate what officer shall act as President in case of the death,
resignation, removal, or inability of both the President and Vice President.1 Recently the Eightieth Congress passed a statute under this grant
of power. Although the new succession act is frequently alleged to be
unconstitutional, it is similar to the first succession law enacted by the
Second Congress, which contained many of the men who framed the
Constitution and voted for its ratification. The law of I 792 provided
that the President pro tempore of the Senate or, if the presiding officer
of the Senate were not available, the Speaker of the House was to act
as President until the disability of the President or Vice President was
removed or a President elected. The new law reverses the order of
succession placing the Speaker before the President pro tempore, and it
does not contain the special election provisions of the earlier law. There,
if vacancy occurred in the Presidency and Vice Presidency simultaneously, the Secretary of State was to notify the governors of the states
and the machinery for the election of a President was to be brought
into operation. Such a special election was to be held only if the notification were made at least two months before the first Wednesday in
December of the first three years of a presidential term.2
The inadequacy of this law was demonstrated in the post Civil War
period. The impeachment of Andrew Johnson emphasized the danger
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of designating the President pro tempore who is a member of the tribunal
by whose decree vacancy may be produced. If Johnson had been removed,
Ben Wade would have succeeded; yet Wade was himself concerned in
the conspiracy to impeach Johnson and voted for the removal. 8 If
the Presidency and Vice Presidency became vacant be.tween sessions of
Congress, there might be neither a President pro tempore nor a Speaker
to succeed. Such was the case when President Garfield died in r 8 8 r and
when Vice President Hendricks died in r 8 85. If calamity had befallen
Arthur or Cleveland before the organization of Congress, there would
have been no successor and no constitutional means of selecting one.4
Finally, objection was made to designating a successor who might be
of a di:fferent party from that of the President. When the Republican
Arthur assumed presidential power, the Democrats controlled the Senate; and when Cleveland had no Vice President to succeed, the upper
chamber was organized by the Republicans. The result of this chain of
events was the enactment of the second presidential succession law.

B. Law of z886
The Presidential Succession Act of r886, which was on the statute
books when President Roosevelt died, provided that the Secretary of
State should exercise presidential power in case both President and
Vice President were unable to serve.5 Truman was more than sixty years
of age and had nearly four years of heavy responsibility ahead of
him. The politicians seemed to fear the succession of Secretary of State
Stettinius, who was not schooled in politics. In May of 1945, James A.
8

STRYKER, ANDREW JOHNSON 310-316 (1929); DEWI'IT, THE IMPEACHMENT
AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON 339-393, 553, 576 (1903).
4
See an unpublished doctoral dissertation, RuTH C. SILVA, PRESIDENTIAL SuccESSION 181-186 (University of Michigan, 1948). Before the Twentieth Amendment the
old Congress expired on March 3 of the odd numbered years and the new Congress did
not convene until the following December unless called into special session. Thus, for
nine months out of every twenty-four ther.e likely would be no successor. The situation
was intensified by the usage that the President pro tempore of the Senate ceased to be
President pro tempore when the Vice President resumed the chair or when the Senate
adjourned. This objection to the designation of legislative officers no longer exists.
Under the Twentieth Amendment the old Congress expires every other January third and
the new Congress meets on the same day. This allows Congress seventeen days in which
to organize and choose presiding officers before the inauguration of the President. Under
the Senate rule of 1890 the President pro tempore is a more or less permanent official.
S. MAN. 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 5, note. Whether this rule is constitutional or not,
however, is at least questionable. Id. 3 I z; U.S. Const., Art. I, § 3.
5
24 Stat. L. 1 (1886); 3 U.S.C. (1946) §§ 21-22.
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Farley pointed out that Truman was in a position to pick his own successor by appointing a Secretary of State. This, Farley thought, circumvented the democratic process.6 Meanwhile, the Potsdam meeting was
approaching and would take Truman and Stettinius out of the country
simultaneously. This was the situation which aroused Congressional
interest in presidential succession.

C. Legislative History of Law of z947
While interest in the subject was increasing, Mr. Truman sent a
special message to Congress asking for a change in the succession law.
Under the Truman plan the Speaker of the House and the President
pro tempore of the Senate would replace the cabinet members as the
heirs apparent. These officers would be required to resign their Congressional posts before exercising presidential power and would be
ineligible to serve unless they possessed the constitutional qualifications
as to age, residence, and citizenship. If no presiding legislative officer
were available, the ranking cabinet member would serve until a presiding
legislative officer became available. The successor would, in any case,
act as President only until the next Congressional election, at which a
President would be chosen to complete the unexpired portion of the
term. Truman maintained that his plan was more "democratic" than the
law of r886 because the speaker is popularly elected and the President
of a democracy should not have power to designate his successor or, in
e:ffect, to take such action by changing Secretaries of State.7
Immediate Congressional and editorial reaction was favorable to
the Truman plan. As time went on, however, enthusiasm for the plan
waned, and serious constitutional problems were raised. On June 2 5,
Representative Sumners of Texas introduced a bill which embodied all
of Truman's proposals. On June 27 the Committee on the Judiciary
had a meeting and, without discussion, hearings, or study, reported the
bill favorably. The bill provided_that, if vacancy occurred more than
ninety days before the regular Congressional election, the appointment
of presidential electors would concur with the Congressional election.
Otherwise, no special presidential election would be called. A speciallyelected President was to serve only for the unexpired portion of the
term. 8 The committee report merely explained the provisions of the
6

25 CoNG. DIG. 87, 89 (March, 1946).
91 CoNG. REc. 6272, 6280 (1945).
8 H.R. 3 587, 79th Cong., 1st sess. ( I 945). For text of bill without amendments see
91 CoNG. REc. 7023-7024 (1948).
7
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measure and denied that it was unconstitutional without making a real
attempt to deal with the constitutional problems.9
The bill was given only the most perfunctory consideration. Important. questions of policy and constitutionality were not seriously considered. The consensus of Republican opinion seems to have been that,
if the President must be a Democrat, they would prefer Rayburn;
and Democratic opinion favore9: Martin if the President must be a
Republican. The chief argument offered in favor of the bill was that
it was more "democratic" to have the Speaker act as President because
he is popularly elected in his district and again chosen by the House,
which approximates the electoral colleges. Opponents of the bill argued
that its enactment would be a legislative encroachment on the executive
and would encourage the removal of the President.10
Representative John M. Robsion objected to the provision for a
special election on the ground that it might cause instability in the executive branch. It conceivably might mean three Presidents, the changing
of forty-eight sets of election laws, an election, then a fourth President,
all in 895 days. Even if the provision for a special election were constitutional, the gentleman from Kentucky thought it was bad policy.11
:Vorys of Ohio, Eberharter of Pennsylvania, and Roe of Maryland all
said that such a special election could not be called in their states in ninety
days. The House, confronted with these objections, struck the special
election provisions from the bill.12 After a brief, two-hour discussion,
the bill passed the House by a vote of I 67 to 32 amid cheers for Sam
Rayburn.18
The Senate received the act with less enthusiasm. The measure was
referred to the Committee on Privileges and Elections, from which it
was never reported. Meanwhile James F. Byrnes was appoirtted Secretary of State. The Senate appeared to be satisfied with Byrnes as a
prospective successor to Truman, and presidential succession was largely
ignored until after the Congressional elections. House Democrats took
a different view of the matter after November, 1946. The Republicans
returned a majority to both houses of Congress, and the bill now indi9 H. REP. 829, 79th Cong., 1st sess. (1945). The committee approved the bill by
a vote of ten to nine. N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1945, p. 1:2. None of the other bills and
resolutions dealing with presidential succession was reported out of committee.
10
91 CoNG. REc. 7008-7028 (1945).
11
Id. 7020, 7024.
12
Id. 7024-7028.
18
Id. 7028. N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1945, p. I :2.
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cated Martin rather than Rayburn as its chief beneficiary. Senate Republicans, who had been indifferent to Truman's plan, became interested
in the measure which with some amendment afforded an opportunity to
place the President pro tempore of the Senate, Arthur Vandenberg, first
in the line of succession. Truman was unmoved by the election returns,
insisting that, if the plan were sound when a Democrat was the Speaker,
it was equally sound when a Republican sat on the dais of the House.14
Georgia's struggle over gubernatorial succession stimulated a further
interest in presidential succession.15 Truman in a letter to Senator :Vandenberg again recommended Congressional action.16 After holding hearings, the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration reported the
Wherry bill favorably. 11 On June 27, 1947, over strong Democratic
opposition, the Senate passed this bill which differed only in minor
respects from the Sumners bill passed by the House in 1945.18 After
the most perfunctory debate, the House of Representatives concurred
with the Senate by an overwhelming majority.10 The act was signed by
the President and became the law on July 18.
When the Senate was considering the measure, Senator Russell
proposed an amendment which would have given the President pro
tempore precedence over the Speaker in the line of succession, as provided
in the act of 1792. The Russell amendment was rejected after Senator
Vandenberg spoke against it.20 The committee reports and speeches in
support of the Wherry bill followed the same line taken in the debate
of the Sumners proposal in the Seventy-ninth Congress: The provisions
of the bill were thoroughly explained; constitutional questions were
largely ignored or dismissed; it was argued that having a popularly
elected officer succeed would be more "democratic" than having an appointed officer and that allowing the President, in effect, to designate his
own successor by appointment of a Secretary of State was "undemocratic."
14

Id. Nov. 13, 1946, p. 24:7.
Id. Jan. 26, 1947, § 4, p. 10:3.
16
93 CONG, REC. 786 (1947).
17
S. REP. 80, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (1947). The report did nothing but briefly
summarize the provisions of the bill. It made no mention of the constitutional problems.
The committee vote was eight Republicans to five Democrats.
18
93 CoNG. REc. 7691-7713, 7766-7786 (1947). The Senate vote was forty-seven
Republicans and three Democrats favoring the bill and thirty-five Democrats opposing it.
19
Id. 8620-8635. The House vote was 365 to 11, with ten Democrats and one
Republican voting against the act. See also H. REP. 817, 80th Cong., 1st sess (1947).
Chairman Michener said the Judiciary Committee voted twenty-six to one in favor of
the bill.
20
93 CoNc. REc. 7781 (1947).
15
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947
The Presidential Succession Act of 1947 embodies all of Truman's
suggestions except the one for a special election of a President to complete
the term. 21 It provides that in case of the death, resignation, removal,
inability, or failure to qualify of the President and Vice President, the
Speaker of the House, upon resignation as Speaker and Representative
in Congress, shall act as President. If there is no Speaker, or if he is
disabled or fails to qualify, the President pro tempore of the Senate,
upon resignation as President pro tempore and as a Senator, shall act
as President. An individual who exercises presidential power under
these circumstances is to serve for the residue of the current presidential
term except in two cases. (I) When acting because of the failure of the
President-elect or Vice President-elect to qualify, he serves only until
one of them qualifies. ( 2) When a legislative officer acts as President
because of the inability of the President or Vice President, he serves
only until the removal of the disability. Under the statute a President
pro tempore upon whom the presidential powers and duties devolve will
not be displaced by the subsequent .election of a new Speaker who is
able to qualify.
If there is no presiding legislative officer or if neither of them
qualifies to act as President, the Secretary of State is to act in that capacity.
The other Cabinet members are placed after the Secretary of State in
the line of succession as provided in the act of I 8 86. 22 The law requires
a succeeding cabinet officer to take the presidential oath, and the taking
of this oath shall be held to constitute resignation from his cabinet
office. His right to act as President under the statute continues only until
a Speaker or President pro tempore is available and qualifies to
supersede him. In case of the succession of a lower ranking cabinet
officer, the removal of the inability of the higher ranking cabinet member
or his ability and willingness to qualify will not terminate the presidential
service of the succeeding cabinet officer. In all cases, the person must
possess the constitutional qualifications as to age, residence, and citizenPROVISIONS OF THE AcT OF I

61 Stat. L. 380 (1947).
The act of I 947 includes in the line of succession the three cabinet posts, agriculture, commerce, and labor, which were established after 1886, and which consequently
were not covered by the provisions of the earlier law. Under the National Security Act
of 1947 [61 Stat. L. 495 at 509, § 3II (1947)] the Secretary of Defense replaces the
Secretary of War who, along with the Secretary of the Navy, is dropped from the list
of successors.
21

22
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ship. Cabinet officers whose appointments have not been consented to by
the Senate or who are under impeachment at the time are ineligible to
act as President.

III
CONSTITUTIONAL QuESTIONS RAISED BY THE AcT OF r

947

A. Are Speaker and President pro tempore "Officers''
in Constitutional Sense?
The constitutional objection most frequently raised against the new
presidential succession law is that the presiding legislative officers are
not officers in the constitutional sense and thus are not eligible for designation. The Constitution empowers Congress to declare "what Officer"
shall act as President in certain contingencies. The framers of the Constitution doubtless intended the term "Officer" to mean "Officer of the
United States." The original motion offered by Edmund Randolph
used this language, as did the draft sent to the Committee of Style. In
the convention some opposed this phraseology on the ground that the
legislature would be limited to making temporary appointments of
"officers" of the United States. Madison reported that the objectors
wished the Congress to be free to designate persons other than officers.
In spite of this objection the motion was carried by a vote of six to four. 23
The Committee of Style, which had no authority to change substantive
provisions but only to consolidate and clarify them as voted, deleted "of
the United States" and the alteration went unnoticed. 24
When the First Congress considered legislation, there was objection
to placing the presiding legislative officers in the line of succession on
the ground that they were not "officers" within the meaning of the
Constitution. Representatives White, Williamson, Sedgwick, Smith, and
Carroll argued that designating the President pro tempore as successor
to the President was directly repugnant to the Constitution. Only Representatives Livermore and Sherman took the opposite position. Gerry
thought the succession was not confined to officers of the United States
and said the term "officer" included state officers.25 The poorly reported
debates do not show that any other constitutional question was discussed.
When Benson moved to designate the Chief Justice, meaning John Jay,
Madison, having Thomas Jefferson in mind, immediately suggested the
Secretary of State. Vice President Adams, the presiding officer in the
28

2 FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 532, 535, 573
(1937).
24
Id. 598-599.
25
2 ANN. CoNG., 1st Cong., 1853-1855, 1863-1865 (1791).
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Senate, reported that such a partisan spirit appeared between the supporters of the two rivals that the matter was dropped. 26
The bill, which became the act of I792, originated in the Senate of
the Second Congress. The Hamiltonian upper chamber had placed its
own presiding officer first in the line of succession; 27 but the House
amended the act, substituting the Secretary of State for the President
pro tempore of the Senate. There is no record of the Senate de~ates on
the passage of this measure; 28 but it is clear that some members of the
House doubted the constitutionality of designating legislative officers as
successors to the President.20 Abraham Baldwin, Thomas Fitzsimons,
James Madison, and Hugh Williamson, all of whom had been members
of the Philadelphia Convention, voted for the motion to strike out the
President pro tempore as the President's successor. so All the Representatives who had been members of the Constitutional Convention voted
against placing the Speaker of the House in the line of succession; 81 and
all but Elbridge Gerry voted to put the Secretary of State in place of the
26

6 WoRKS OF JOHN ADAMS, Charles Francis Adams ed., 545-546 (1856). On
this point in a letter to Thomas Dwight dated January 24, 1791, Fisher Ames wrote
in part: "On a late debate on the bill to provide what officer shall act as President, when
the two :first offices shall be vacant, the ambition of Mr. Jefferson's friends was disclosed.
They contended for him with zeal. That will have its share in the business of the session.
All this is inter nos." I WoRKS OF F1sHER AMES, Seth Ames ed., 93 (1854).
27
S. JouR., 1st & 2d Cong., p. 41 (1791).
28
No record of Senate debates was kept at that time. The Library of Congress, the
National Archives, and the Senate Library contain nothing concerning the Senate
debates on the passage of the act of 1792. The published papers of Senators in the Second
Congress have been searched but no information on this subject was found. The unpublished papers of the following have also been searched, without reward: Richard Basset
and George Reed (Historical Society of Delaware); Oliver Ellsworth and Roger Sherman
(Connecticut Historical Society); William Few, James Gunn, and Abraham Baldwin
(Georgia Historical Society and the Georgia Department of Archives and History);
John Henry and Charles Carroll (Maryland Historical Society); Caleb Strong, George
Cabot, and Elbridge Gerry (Massachusetts Historical Society); James Langdon, Paine
Wingate, and Nicholas Gilman (New Hampshire Historical Society); Philemon Dickinson and John Rutherford (New Jersey Historical Society); Benjamin Hawkins, Samuel_
Johnston, and Hugh Williamson (Southern Historical Collection, University of North
Carolina); Pierce Butler and Ralph Izard (South Carolina Historical Society); Stephen
R. Bradley and Moses Robinson (Vermont Historical Society and the Bennington
Historical Museum).
29 See the remarks of Jonathan Sturges of Connecticut and of Alexander White of
Virginia, both Federalists, and of the anti-Federalist William B. Giles of Virginia.
ANN. CoNG., 2d Cong., 281 (1791).
80 Id. 303. Elbridge Gerry and Nicholas Gilman were the only former members
of the Constitutional Convention to vote for keeping the President pro tempore in the
line of succession. Gerry was absent from the Convention on August 6, 1787, when the
succession clause was discussed; and Gilman did not attend the Convention until July 23.
81 Id. 303. They were Baldwin, Fitzsimons, Gerry, Madison, and Williamson.
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President pro temp ore as successor to the President.82 The Senate refused
to concur in the House amendment, and the House agreed to the Senate
version. Three who were formerly of the Federal Convention, Dayton,
Fitzsimons, and Gerry, voted to concur in the Senate version while Baldwin, Gilman, Madison, and Williamson voted against concurrence.88
After both houses passed the bill.placing the President pro tempore and
the Speaker in the line of succession, James Madison wrote Edmund
Pendleton that the act was unconstitutional for several reasons, among
which were:
"1. It may be questioned whether these are officers in the
Constitutional sense. 2. If officers, whether both could be introduced.
3. As they are created by the Constitution, they would probably
have been there designated if contemplated for such service, instead
of being left to the Legislative selection.ns4
The committee reports and the speeches in support of the constitutionality of the plan, which ultimately became the Presidential Succession
Act of 1947, depended heavily on the argument that legislative officers
were placed in the line of succession by the Second Congress, whose
views on the Constitution have long been regarded as authoritative.8 G
In answer to this argument, opponents of the bill pointed out that an
act of the First Congress was declared unconstitutional in Marbury v.
Madison and that Madison and others who had been members of
the Federal Convention considered the law of 1792 unconstitutional.86
Further, the first succession act resulted from Hamilton's antipathy for
Jefferson, not from mature deliberation. This conclusion is supported by
the testimony of Alexander Hamilton himself. In a letter to Colonel
Carrington, he wrote:
"'T is evident, beyond a question ... that Mr. Jefferson aims
with ardent desire at the Presidential chair•••• You know how much
it was a point to establish the Secretary of State, as the officer who
was to administer the government in de~ect of the President and
Vice-President. Here, I acknowledge, though I took far less part
than was supposed, I ran counter to Mr. Jefferson's wishes; but if
82

Id. 402. They were Baldwin, Fitzsimons, Gilman, Madison, and Williamson.
Id. 417-418.
84 I LE'ITERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 549 (1865).
5
G See for example, Monroney and Sumners, 91 CoNG. REc. 7012, 7022 (1945);
and the opinion of acting Attorney General McGregor, H. REP. 817, 80th Cong., 1st
sess,, pp. 2-4 (1947).
86
See for example, Hancock and Hatch, 91 CoNG. REc. 7014-7015, 8273 (1945);
Hatch and Gwynne, 93 CoNG. REc. 7766-7770, 8628-8629 (1947).
88
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I had had no other reason for it, I had already experienced opposition from him, which rendered it a measure of self-defence." 87
Fisher Ames, Massachusetts Federalist, confirms that the Secretary
of State was not made successor to the President because of antipathy
toward Jefferson. He reported with satisfaction to Thomas Dwight:
"The Secretary of State is struck out of the bill for the future
Presidency, in case of the two first offices becoming vacant. His
friends seemed to think it important to hold him up as King of the
Romans. The firmness of the Senate kept him out." 88
William Rives, a partisan of Jefferson, agrees that the desire of Hamilton's followers to keep Jefferson from the presidential chair caused the
President pro tempore of the Senate to be named instead of the Secretary
of State. He said:
"That this decision proceeded mainly, if not exclusively, from
feelings of personal and political enmity to the gentleman who
then filled the office of secretary of State, and the jealousy entertained of him by the friends and partisans of the secretary of the
treasury, is rendered apparent by the surviving memorials of the
time." 89
Again Rives wrote:
". • . The great zeal shown to prevent the secretary of State
being declared in the line of succession to so remote and shadowy
an inheritance, arose from its connection with another question of
present interest and feeling. It was the pretension of the secretary
of the treasury and his friends, that, in analogy to the position of the
first lord of the treasury in the English cabinet, he ought to be
considered prime minister and head of the cabinet here. A legislative declaration that the secretary of State should succeed to the
Presidency in the event of a double vacancy in the offices of both
President and Vice-President, however improbable the actual occurrence of such a contingency, would, it was thought, operate as
a negative to this pretension." 40
37
8 WoRKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 261 (1886).
Dated May 26, 1792.
88
I WoRKS OF FISHER AMES II4 (1854).
89
3 RIVES, HISTORY OF THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JAMES MADISON 223 (1868).
Rives (1793-1868) was a political leader of-the Jeffersonian tradition in Virginia and had
studied law and politics under Jefferson for several years. Rives' volume here cited
is based on much detailed study of documents and is done with sound scholarship.
40
3 id. 224, note. Italics Rives'.
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During the Congressional debates from 1881 to 1886, all of the
sagacious speeches questioned whether the presiding legislative officers
were "officers" in the constitutional sense,41 and this doubt was one of
the chief reasons for repealing the law of 1792. The Blount case is most
frequently cited as authority for the doctrine that members of Congress
are not "officers" within the meaning of the Constitution. In this case
Senator Blount was impeached. Jared Ingersoll and A. J. Dallas, who
represented the defendant, entered plea to jurisdiction on the grounds
that Blount as a Senator was not an officer of the United States and hence
was not liable to impeachment and that, even if Blount were an officer
as a Senator, he was no longer an officer because the Senate had already
expelled him. After four days of secret debate on the subject, the Senate
by a vote of fourteen to eleven decided to dismiss the case. The Senate
ascribed no reason for its decision; but it is generally accepted that the
Senate ruled a member of Congress not to be an officer in the constitutional sense.42
The Representatives who acted as prosecutors in the Blount case
depended almost entirely on collateral aids for a definition of officer.
They quoted from dictionaries, statutes and the like to show that these
"authorities" use the term "officer" in a less strict sense. Those who have
argued that a member of Congress is an officer of the United States and
thus eligible for designation to act as President have used this same
approach.48
The definition of officer found in dictionaries and statutes cannot
be accepted, however, because the Constitution establishes a distinction
between an officer and a member of Congress,44 and it is a well established
41
For example, Beck, Jones, Maxey, Garland, and Coke, 13 CoNG. REc. 123-126,
130, 137-141 (1881); Garland, Maxey, Lapham, and Sherman, 14 CoNG. REc. 877,
913-915, 921, 957 (1883); Maxey, Morgan, and Eden, 17 CoNG. REc. 215, 221-223
(1885), id. 668 (1886). See also H. REP. 26, 49th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 1-3 (1886).
42
ANN. CoNG., 5th Cong., 2244-2415 (1799). An able battery of Congressmen
including Robert Goodhue Harper of Maryland and James A. Bayard of Vermont presented the case for the House. See especially the brief of Dallas, id. 2270-2278.
48
See the remarks of Edmunds and Jones, 14 CoNG. REc. 690 (1882), id. 880-881
(1883); Call, Edmunds, and Rowell, 17 CoNG. REc. 224,251 (1885), id. 679 (1886);
Monroney, Kefauver, Walter of Pennsylvania, Sumners, and White, 91 CoNG. REc.
7013, 7016-7017, 7020, 7022, 7025 (1945). See also the opinion of acting Attorney
General McGregor reprinted in H. REP. 817, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 4 (1947).
44 Art. II, § I: " ••• no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of
Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector."
Art. II, § 2: " ••• [The President] shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
established by Law: but the Co}!gress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior
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rule of constitutional interpretation that intrinsic aids are to be used
in preference to extrinsic aids. 45 This distinction has been recognized by
all three branches of the government. 46
The courts have been especially careful not to enlarge the meaning
of the term officer as used in the Constitution. They have defined an
officer of the United States as a person appointed by the President and
the Senate, by the President alone, by the courts, or by a department
head, and commissioned by the President.47 The courts have not departed
from this rule, yet they have recognized that the word officer may have
a less restricted meaning in certain statutes. In such cases the courts have
been careful to distinguish the constitutional from the statutory use of
the term and in each case have restricted their interpretation to the case
at bar. The question was raised in Lamar v. United States, and the ruling
in this case is frequently cited in support of the contention that a member
of Congress is an officer of the United States. In the Lamar case, the
Court actually held that members of Congress are officers of the United
States within the meaning of section 32 of the criminal code. Justice
Holmes, speaking for the Court in the first Lamar case, and Justice
· White, speaking for the majority in the second, were careful to distinguish this decision from earlier ones which had held that members of
Congress were not officers in the constitutional sense.48
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the
Heads of the Departments."
Art. II, § 4: "The President, Vice President and aU civil Officers of the United
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction .•."
Amend. XIV, § 3: "No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress
••• or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States.•.•" (Italics the
author's.)
45
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. l at 27, 13 S.Ct. 3 (1892).
46
See the opinion of Attorney General Brewster, holding that members of Congress
may be "officers of the Government" within the meaning of a certain statute but are not
"officers of the United States" in the constitutional sense. 17 OP. Am. GEN. 419
(1882). Congress decided that the law forbidding officers of the United States to solicit
or receive contributions for political purposes did not apply to members of Congress.
51 CoNG.· REc. 8831 (1914). See also the arguments of Saulsbury and Bayard, CONG.
GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st sess., 320-331, A31-A37 (1864). The question here was
whether or not Senator Bayard was an officer within the meaning of the test oath law, but
the question was argued as to whether or not he was an officer in the constitutional sense.
47
United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508 (1879); United States v. Monat,
124 U.S. 303, 8 S.Ct. 505 (1888); United States v. Smith, 124 U.S. 525, 8 S.Ct.
595 (1888); Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 26 S.Ct. 688 (1906); Totus v.
United States, (D.C. D.C. 1941) 39 F. Supp. 7.
48
Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60, 36 S.Ct. 255, 241 U.S. 103, 36 S.Ct.
535 (1916). For an explanation of the Lamar cases, see United States v. Gradwell,
(D.C. R.I. 1916) 234 F. 446. See also United States v. Hartwell, 6 Wall. (73 U.S.) 385
(1867); United States v. Hendee, 124 U.S. 309, 8 S.Ct. 507 (1888). In spite of the
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Whether -0r not a member of Congress is an "officer of the United
States" within the meaning of the Constitution, however, is not the
question involved in succession legislation. A distinction may be made
between the rank and file members and the presiding officers. Representative Peters argued in 1886 that the Speaker and President pro
tempore may be officers in the constitutional sense even though Senators
and Representatives are not. 49 The succession acts of 1792 and 1947
name the successors as the presiding officers not as members of Congress.
Thus the real question is whether or not these are "officers of the United
States." Employing intrinsic aids, the question would have to be answered
in the negative. The Constitution distinguishes between the President
pro tempore and an officer by saying, "the Senate shall chuse their other
Officers, and also a President pro tempore." 6° Confronted with this
language, some have argued that the Speaker is an officer even though
the President pro tempore is not. They contend that the Constitution
itself refers to the Speaker as an officer by declaring, "the House of
Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers." The antecedent of "their" is clearly "House of Representatives" and not "United
States." 51 Thus, the Constitution does not even recognize the President
pro tempore as an officer of the Senate and recognizes the Speaker only
as an officer of the House, not as an officer of the United States.
Other sections of the Constitution support this interpretation. Article
II, section 3, declares that the President "shall Commission all the
Officers of the United States"; but the only commission the Speaker or
President pro tempore has is the commission issued by the governor of
his state. Furthermore, the Constitution forbids an officer to be a member
of Congress, but the President pro tempore is always a Senator and the
Speaker is a Representative.6 2 The only possible conclusion is that the
Constitution does not contemplate the presiding legislative officers as
officers of the United States.
carefully limited ruling of the Court in the Lamar cases, John W. Davis, who was the
Solicitor General in 1916, recently said: ''While the Lamar case deals with the statute and
not with the Constitution itself, I think it stands for the doctrine that 'members of
Congress are officers.' I don't accept the contrary view that that term is applicable only
to those who hold office by reason of appointment rather than election." N.Y. TIMES,
July 17, 1945, p. 12:5.
49
17 CoNG. REc, 671 (1886).
60
Art. I, § 3. (Italics the author's.)
61
Art. I, § 2. (Italics the author's.)
112
Art I, § 6. (Italics the author's.) Of course the Constitution does not require that
these legislative officers be members of their respective houses; but in practice they always
are.
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This interpretation is supported by all the commentators. Not one
of them defines "officer of the United States" in such a way as to include
members of Congress or the presiding officer of either house. 58 Since
neither members of Congress nor the presiding legislative officers are
"officers of the United States" in the constitutional sense, they are ineligible for designation to act as President. But even if they were constitutionally eligible, the Succession Act of 1947 is an evasion of the intent
of the Constitution. The Federal Convention originally made the President of the Senate, who was elected by the Senate, the President's first
successor. After the theory of separation of powers was introduced and
provision made for the independent election of the President, objection
was made that a legislative officer should not be allowed to succeed to the
executive powers. Such an arrangement, it was argued, was repugnant to
the independence of the two branches. To meet this objection, an independently elected Vice President was provided and made the President's
first successor.54

B. May "0 fficer'' Exercise Presidential Powers but Resign Office?
A second constitutional objection to the Succession Act of 1947 is
that the person on whom presidential powers devolve must continue to
hold the office to which these powers and duties are annexed while the
statute requires him to resign his office. Before 1945, there was almost
universal agreement that Congress is given power merely to annex
presidential power to an office, not to designate what officer shall become
53
SERGEANT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 363-364 (1822); RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE
CONSTITUTION 203 (1825); 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 257-260 (1833); POMROY, INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 481-482 (1870); I FOSTER, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CoNSTITUTION 566-573 (1895); BLACK, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw 112 (1895); 1 TucKER, THE CoNSTITUTION oF THE UNITED STATES 412-414
(1899), and 2 id. 713; 2 WATSON, THE CoNSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 972,
1032 (1910); BURDICK, THE LAw OF THE AMERICAN CoNSTITUTION 86-87 (1922);
3 WILLOUGHBY, THE CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 2d ed., 1448,
1466, 1505 (1929). Kent, Cooley and Hare did not treat this subject in their commentaries on the Constitution. See also Henry Davis, "Inability of the President," S. Doc.
308, 65th Cong., 3d sess., p. II (1919); Fulton, "Presidential Inability," 24 ALBANY
L.J. 286 at 288 (1881); Hamlin, "The Presidential Succession Act of 1886," 18 HARV.
L. REv. 182 at 186-190 (1905).
54
2 FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 186, 427, 496502, 511-516, 521-529, 535-538, 572-575, 659 (1937); 3 id. 394. The Presidential
Succession Act of 1947 is clearly constitutional in its application to the case of a Presidentelect because the Twentieth Amendment empowers Congress to declare what person
[ not what officer] shall act as President in certain contingencies.
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the President.55 Neither the earlier laws nor any proposals which were
seriously considered before 1945 provided for the resignation of the
acting President from the office which entitled him to act as such. Concerning the first succession act Madison wrote:
"Either they [ the designated legislative officers] will retain
their Legislative stations, and then incompatible functions will be
blended; or the incompatability will supersede those stations, and
then those being the substratum of the adventitious functions, these
must fail also. The Constitution says, Congress may declare what
officers, &c., which seems to make it not an appointment or a translation, but an annexation of one office or trust to another office." 56
Madison's argument was repeated among the objections raised to
this law when the Presidential Succession Act of 1886 was being considered. Various members of Congress pointed out that under the law of
1792 the acting President, as a member of the Senate, passed on his own
nominations and treaties, that the Senate could oust an acting President
by electing a new presiding officer, and that the President pro tempore
of the Senate could not continue to act as President after the expiration
of his term as Senator. Such objections are without merit unless based
on the assumption that the President pro tempore must retain his legislative office while acting as President of the United States. Many members of the Forty-seventh, Forty-eighth, and Forty-ninth Congresses
expressly stated that these objections could not be met by resignation
from the post of President pro tempore because his right to act as
President depended on his incumbency of the legislative office. This
seems to have been one of the compelling reasons for enacting the law of
1886. It was felt that the Under Secretary of State could relieve the
Secretary of State of his departmental duties while the latter acted as
President, but that a legislative officer could have no such relief from his
legislative duties. 57 This interpretation of the Constitution was clearly
55
The one exception was Egbert Benson who said that he supposed that whenever
the designated officer was acting as President, he would resign his other office. 2 ANN.
CoNG., 1st. Cong., 1866 (1791).
56
l LE'ITERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 549 (1865).
57
See for example, the opinion of D. F. Murphy, Maxey, and Hoar, 13 CONG.
REc. 126, 130 (1881) id., 4975 (1882), respectively. Senator Hoar, author of the
act of 1886 and recognized authority on presidential succession, spoke as follows: "It
is not a person holding an office at the time succeeding to the Presidency, but it is an
officer continuing in that office who is to perform as an annex or incident merely to
another office the great duties of the Presidency itself. The moment he lays down or
becomes incapable to perform the duties of the principle office to which the Presidency is
annexed, that moment he must lay down or be incapable of performing the duties of the
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summarized by Henry L. Dawes of Massachusetts in the following
language:
"Everybody agrees that this devolution of power upon this
official is not upon the person but upon him ex officio • ••• He can
not, therefore, abandon the office which he held, by virtue of which
the statute clothes him temporarily with the exercise of the executive authority, because thereby he ousts himself from the position
in which he can exercise that executive authority." 58
Tucker is the only constitutional commentator who mentions this
subject. He says that in case of succession beyond the :Vice President,
the office of President does not devolve on the officer designated by the
Congress, but virtute officii the officer "acts as President," and that the
presidential office is vacant, but its functions are performed by the officer
designated by law. He holds that the officer can no longer act as President
if he ceases to be such "officer," because incumbency of the office is his
title to act as President.59
In r945, a new interpretation of the succession clause was advanced.
Previously the presidential status of such an officer was denied as part
of the argument supporting the contention that the Vice President becomes President when the powers and duties of the President devolve
upon him.60 After the acceptance of seven Vice Presidents as becoming
President upon the death of the latter, however, it was an easy step in
r945 to argue that anyone who acts as President thereby becomes the
incumbent of the office. President Truman's proposal and the bills
introduced to carry out his plan were based on the principle that the
Presidency itself.•••" 14 CoNG. REc. 689 (1882). See also the remarks of Morgan
and Sherman, 14 CoNG. REc. 883-886, 957 (1883); of Hoar, Morgan, Seney, and
Dibble, 17 CONG. REc. 180-182, 223 (1885), id. 675, 684 (1886). This point was
emphasized by the House committee reporting the bill which finally became the Succession Act of 1886. H. REP. 26, 49th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 2-4 (1886). See also Rogers,
''Presidential Inability," 2 REvlEW 481 (1920).
58
14 CoNG. REc. 955 (1883).
59 2 TUCKER, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 713-714 (1899).
60 Examination of the records of the Constitutional Convention shows that the
framers of the Constitution did not intend either the Vice President or the officer designated by Congress to become President by succession. Rather, he was to keep his original
office and merely act as President. Beginning in 1841, there have been two schools of
thought on the subject. One adopts the position of the framers of the Constitution,
and the other argues that the Vice President actually becomes the President when the
powers and duties of the latter devolve upon him. Before 1945, both schools agreed that
the officer designated by Congress would not become the President by succession but
would merely act in that capacity ex officio. See SiLvA, PRESIDENTIAL SuccESSION, 6-131
(University of Michigan, 1948).
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designated officer would not merely assume presidential powers ex officio,
but would become the President; and, therefore, his retention of the
office by virtue of which the presidential powers devolved upon him was
irrelevant.
Arguments o:ffered in the Seventy-ninth Congress in support of the
plan were generally confusing on this question. 6 1. The report of the
House committee assumed that the officer would hold the presidential
office and argued, therefore, that he would have to resign his legislative
post because the Constitution denied membership in Congress to an
officer of the United States.62 In the Eightieth Congress, Senator Wherry,
author of the Presidential Succession Act of 1947, unequivocally stated
that he thought the "officer" would not have to continue to hold his
qualifying office because he would become the President of the United
States.63 This interpretation of the constitutional clause is the one on
which the new succession law is based. The statute provides that the
legislative officers must resign their Congressional posts and that the
taking of the presidential oath by a cabinet officer shall be held to constitute his resignation from the office, by virtue of the holding of which
he qualifies to act as President.6
Since there are no federal rulings on this point, one must look to the
decisions of state courts. In some of the states the courts have held that
the succeeding officer becomes the governor by force of the functions
devolved upon him. In these states there is no need for the successor to
4,

o1. For example, the following colloquies took place in the House of Representatives:
Taber: "The Constitution provides that whoever might be selected for succession
must be an officer. This bill provides that the Speaker cannot become President or Acting
President without first resigning as Speaker."
Sumners: ''Yes."
Taber: "Then he would not be an officer."
Sumners: "I believe he would."
Taber: "He would cease to be an officer when he resigns."
Sumners: "The thing will be simultaneous. I think that is in conformance with our
general philosophy." 91 CONG. REc. 7023 (1945). The implication of Sumners' position
seems to be that the Speaker would become the President, but not five minutes before
he admitted that the Speaker would not become the President. Id. 7022. See also arguments of Taber and Judd, id. 7026-7027, and the arguments of Hancock and Hatch,
id. 7015, 8273-8274. Professor Edward S. Corwin also took the position that the
"officer'' would have to keep his original office, a thing that would be especially objectionable, he thought, in case of the Speaker. U.S. NEWS 36 (July 13, 1945).
62
H. REP. 829, 79th Cong., 1st sess., p. 4 (1945). This in itself is, of course, a
denial that the Speaker is an officer of the United States.
68
93 CoNG. REc. 7771-7772 (1947). See also S. HEARINGS ON S. CoN. RES. 1,
S. 139, S. 536, S. 564, 80th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 41, 43.
6
' 61 Stat. L. 380, §§ a(1), b, and d(3) (1947).
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continue to hold the office by virtue of which he qualified to become
Governor. 05 In fact, continuance in his former office would probably be
incompatible with holding the gubernatorial office. In other states where
the courts do not recognize the successor as becoming governor, it has
been held that resignation from the office to which the gubernatorial
powers are appendant prevents the person from exercising gubernatorial
power.66 Both rulings are logical; they are merely based on different
views of the status of the successor. The same logic should bind the law
of presidential succession; but the act of I947 is based on two irreconcilable premises. It recognizes the designated officer as becoming President by providing for his resignation from his legislative or cabinet post
while at the same time it denies that he is the President by not giving
him the tenure guaranteed to a President.
There are two conceivable ways of limiting the succeeding officer's
tenure as acting President. The first is to restrict his right to act as President to the time when some other official qualifies. If the designated officer
actually becomes the President, he has a term of four years under the
65
See for example, Chadwick v. Earhart, II Ore. 389, 4 P. u8o (1884), in which
it was held that the acting governor was to perform the gubernatorial duties for the
remainder of the term and not only so long as he continued to be the Secretary of State.
State v. Olcott, 94 Ore. 633, 187 P. 286 (1920), in which it was held that the
Secretary of State actually became the Governor for the remainder of the Governor's
term even though his term as Secretary of State expired before such date.
66
Futrell v. Oldham, 107 Ark. 386, 155 S.W. 502 (1913), in which it was held
that the Constitution devolved gubernatorial duties upon whomever holds the Presidency
of the Senate, and a change in the Presidency of the Senate works a change in the performance of the duties of the Governor;· when a new President of the Senate is chosen,
he takes over the gubernatorial functions. See the brief of the appellant setting forth the
position adopted by the court. People ex rel Parks v. Cornforth, 34 Colo. 107, 81 P. 871
(1905), in which the court ruled that the powers and duties of the Lieutenant Governor
devolve upon whomever is the President pro tempore of the Senate, and the right to
exercise these powers passes to a newly-elected President pro tempore. Clifford v. Heller,
63 N.J.L. 105, 42 A. 155 (1899), in which the court ruled that the President of the
Senate upon whom the gubernatorial functions devolved forfeited his right to act as
Governor by resigning his senatorial office and thereby ceasing to be President of the
Senate. See also the dictum of Justice Mitchell: "If an office be appendant ••. to another
office, the determination of the first office will determine the second." Robertson v.
State ex rel. Smith, 109 Ind. 79 at III, IO N.E. 582,643 (1887).
The courts of Montana, Nevada, New York, and Washington have refused to
recognize that the office of Lieutenant Governor becomes vacant when the powers and
duties of the gubernatorial office devolve upon him, pointing out that he remains
Lieutenant Governor entrusted with the powers and duties of the higher office. State
ex. rel. Lamey v. Mitchell, 97 Mont. 252, 34 P. (2d) 369 (1934); State ex. rel. Hardin
v. Sadler, 23 Nev. 356, 47 P. 450 (1897); Ward v. Curran, 266 App. Div. 524, 44
N.Y.S. (2d) 240 (1943); Washington ex. rel. Murphy v. McBride, 29 Wash. 335,
70 P. 25 (1902).
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Constitution and can be removed only by a two-thirds vote of the Senate
upon impeachment by the House of Representatives. His tenure cannot
be merely the remainder of the term or, in the case of a cabinet officer,
only until a Speaker or President pro tempore qualifies to displace him
as provided in the act of r 947.67 If the designated officer does not actually
become the President, perhaps Congress may by law restrict his presidential service to a period of less than four years. Although the officer
would not become the President, but would only act as such, this provision of the law is of doubtful constitutionality. During the debates on
presidential succession in r 883, Senator Edmunds of Vermont suggested
a provision allowing the Secretary of State to act if there were no
President pro tempore or Speaker but requiring him to surrender the
presidential powers to the President pro tempore or Speaker' as soon as
one of these legislative officers was chosen. Senator Hoar, author of the
Presidential Succession Act of r 886, answered by saying that he did not
believe Congress had the power to designate several successors, each of
whom will serve until some other officer qualifies. He pointed out that
Congress is given power to designate an officer to act until the disability
of the President or Vice President is removed or a President elected, but
not until another officer qualifies. 68
The second conceivable way of limiting the tenure of the acting
President is by providing for a special presidential election when the
Presidency and Vice Presidency are both vacant. The question of tenure
is unavoidably raised in any consideration of the power of Congress to
provide for such election. If the designated officer does not become the
President, he cannot claim presidential tenure, and perhaps Congress
has power to provide for the election of a President to replace him. This
presented a problem at the time the new succession law was passed. The
original Truman plan called for a special election in certain cases, but
the proposal was not incorporated in the act of r 947, because there was
doubt as to the power of Congress to enact such a provision.69 Under the
67

61 Stat. L. 380, § d(2) (1947). See also H.R. 3587, 79th Cong., 1st sess. (1945),
and the House committee report thereon, H. REP. 829, 79th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 2-3
(1945).
68
14 CoNG. REc. 880 (1883). In the Forty-ninth Congress Hoar explained that
if there was no Secretary of State when the presidential vacancy occurred, the Secretary
of the Treasury would act as President and, when he appointed a Secretary of State, the
new Secretary of State would not displace him as acting President. ''You never go back
up the ladder after you have gone down a round." 17 CoNG. REc. 220 (1885). See also,
id. 677 (1886).
69
The original Sumners bill contained special election provisions and the report of
the House committee thereon ruled in favor of Congressional power to enact the provisions.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

present law the officer upon whom presidential power devolves is to act
as President for the remainder of the term during which the vacancy
occurs with such exceptions as mentioned above.10
The Constitution states that the officer designated by Congress shall
act as President until a President shall be elected. The Constitution does
not say whether the President is to be elected at the next quadrennial
election or at a special election. Although Congress is not expressly given
power to provide for a special election, the framers of the Constitution
doubtless intended that special presidential elections would be called.
The original clause, introduced by Edmund Randolph, stated that the
designated officer should act as President "until the time of electing a
President shall arrive." James Madison objected to this phraseology
because it would prevent the filling of a vacancy by special election and
moved to substitute the adverbial clause found in the Constitution today,
"until ..• a President shall be elected." Although some objected that
there would be difficulty in calling an election other than at fixed times
because of the process established for the choice of a President, Madison's
motion was adopted. 71 In the Virginia Ratifying Convention, Mason
objected that in case of vacancy in the first two executive offices, there was
no provision for the speedy election of another President. Madison
answered, "When the President and Vice President die, the election of
another President will immediately take place... _,m
It seems clear that Madison's amendment was adopted to permit the
filling of vacancies by special election, but constitutional authorities have
been divided on the question of the power of Congress to provide for
such elections. In I 833, Justice Story suggested that Congress might lack
this power and thought the question could best be resolved by a constitutional amendment.78 Burgess questioned the constitutionality of a
H. REP. 829, 79th Cong., 1st sess., p. 4 (1945). Representative Sumners argued in
favor of the constitutionality of these provisions on the basis of the "general philosophy
of the system we are operating under, which contemplates that it would be better to have
somebody elected by the people act as President than an appointed person." 91 CoNG.
REc. 7023 (1945). Eventually the controversial election provision was stricken from
the bill on grounds of both constitutionality and policy. Id. 7018-7028. The Wherry
bill, which ultimately became the law, did not contain these provisions because Senator
Wherry thought Congress lacked this power. 93 CoNG. REc. 7784 (1945):
70
61 Stat. L. 380, §§ c, d(2) (1947).
71
FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 535 (1937).
72
3 ELLIOTr, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES, 2d ed., 487-488 (1866).
78
3 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 336337 (1833). Story also believed a President could not be chosen under the statute unless
a Vice President was chosen also, because the Constitution requires that these two things
be done together.

1 949]

PRESIDENTIAL SuccESSION AcT

47 1

special election on the ground that March 4 ( now January 20) of every
fourth year is by implication made the beginning of every presidential
term.74 Willoughby did not think mere removal of an obstacle to the
holding of such an election by striking out the provision that the acting
President shall serve "until the time of electing a President shall arrive"
could be held in itself as conferring the power in question upon Congress.111 On the other hand, Rawle and Burdick explain statutory provisions for such special election without questioning the power of Congress
to enact the necessary provisions.76
· Construction given to the succession clause by early Congresses
favors Congressional power to provide for a special election in case both
the Presidency and Vice Presidency are vacant. The act of I 792 contained
special election provisions, and nobody at the time seriously questioned
the power of Congress to enact them.77 While partisanship resolved the
question as to whether or not the presiding officers of the two houses
were eligible to act as President, the Hamilton-Jefferson controversy
played no part in the decision favoring Congressional power to call a
special election. In I 8 56 when the Senate Committee on the Judiciary was
commissioned to study the constitutionality and adequacy of the act of
I 792, the committee held the provisions for a special election to be
constitutional, pointing out that the status and tenure of the officer acting
as President were not such as to prevent Congress from providing for
74

2 BURGESS, POLITICAL Sc1ENCE AND CoMPARATIVE CoNsTITUTIONAL I.Aw 241
(1891). In 1934 the highest court of Montana accepted this position, ruling that no
special election could be held because the term provided for in the state constitution was
four years and applies to the office, not to the person. The state constitution [ Art. VII,
§ 14], however, provided that the successor was to act as governor "for the residue of the
term, or until the disability shall cease." State ex rel. Lamey v. Mitchell, 97 Mont. 252,
34P. (2d) 369 (1934).
711 3 W1LLOUGHBY, THE CoNSTITUTioNAL I.Aw OF THE UNITED STATES, 2d ed.,
1468 (1929). In support of Willoughby's thesis it may be pointed out that the Convention deleted the provision giving Congress the legal tender power [ 2 FARRAND, RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 310 (1937) ], but the Supreme Court upheld
this power in the Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. (79 U.S.) 457, (1871); See also the
opinion of Charles Warren, 91 CoNG. REc. A3639-A3641 (1945).
76
RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION 49-50; BURDICK, THE LAW AND THE
AMERICAN CoNSTITOTION 60-61 (1922). See also Hamlin, "The Presidential Succession
Act of 1886," 18 HARV. L. REV. 182 at 182-195 (1905). The Supreme Court of
Wyoming took the position that in the absence of a constitutional provision for filling
a vacancy in the office of governor, it was within the power of the legislature to do so by
law. In re Moore, 4 Wyo. 98, 31 P. 980 (1893).
77
In the First Congress, Smith of South Carolina, however, expressed the opinion
that the Constitution forbids a special presidential election. 2 ANN. CoNG., 1st Cong.

1854 (1791).
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a special election to select a President. 78 For seventy-five years the constitutionality of this provision of the law went almost unchallenged.
But in I 867, the House Committee on the Judiciary was unanimously of
the opinion that Congress had no power to fill a vacancy in the Presidency
by special election.79
In the :five years from 1881 to 1886, when the whole succession
problem was discussed, opinion was sharply divided on this question.
One objection raised was the possible separation of presidential and
congressional elections and the resulting political confusion which would
accompany the multiplication of elections.80 The initial Hoar bill provided that the designated officer was to act as President until the end of
the term during which the vacancy occurred.81 The bill was amended to
meet the opposition of those who wished to retain the provisions for a
special election as under the act of 1792. The amendments proposed that
the acting President serve only until the disability of the President or
Vice President was removed "or a President elected," 82 and that the
acting Chief Executive call a special session of Congress if that body
were not in session or due to convene within twenty days.83
The effect of these amendments is by no means clear. When the
amendments were adopted, Senator Hoar said that Congress, when
convened, was free to decide whether to call an election or not. Sherman
thought Congress would not have this power under the amended bill.
78

S. Rep. 260, 34th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 5-6 (1856).
CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d sess., 691 (1867).
so See for example, the remarks of Beck and Hoar, 13 CoNG. REc. 123 (1881),
id. 4975 (1882); of Hoar, Garland, and Beck, 14 CoNG. REc. 689-690 (1882), id.,
878-879, 954, 1008-1009 (1883); of Maxey, Morgan, Evarts, and Eden, 17 CoNG.
REc. 216, 224, 248-249 (1885), id. 669 (1886). See also H. REP. 26, 49th Cong.,
1st sess., p. 5 (1886). For an exposition of the opposite thesis, see the remarks of Morgan,
Blair, Sherman, and Ingalls, 14 CoNG. REc. 691 (1882), id. 884, 886-887, 957, 960961 (1883). See also the general discussion, id. 10n-1014; and the remarks of Peters
and Adams, 17 CONG. REc. 670-671, 678 (1886).
81
S. 2035, 47th Cong., for text see 13 CoNG. REc. 4975 (1882).
82
14 CoNG. REc. 1005-1014 (1883).
88
When Ingalls offered the amendment, Senators Garland and Lapham protested
that it was unconstitutional to try to direct the acting President when to call Congress,
for this is a power left to presidential discretion under the Constitution. Id. 1009.
Edmunds of Vermont suggested that some legislative officer, such as the clerk of the Senate,
should be given power to convene Congress in case of vacancy when there was no President pro tempore of the Senate or Speaker of the House. The purpose was to allow each
house an opportunity to choose a presiding officer. Hoar answered that only the President
[or one on whom presidential power had devolved] could convene Congress. Id. 880.
Senators Blair and Jones thought Congress could convene under its own power without
a call from the acting President. Id. 958, IOO~ (1883).
79

1 949}

PRESIDENTIAL SuccEssrnN AcT

473

The debates do not indicate that agreement was reached.84 Later, Senator Hoar said that under his bill the acting President was to complete
the term.85 The House which passed the act of I 886 seems to have understood that the designated officer was to complete the unexpired portion
of the term unless he were only acting ad interim because of a temporary
inability on the part of the President or :Vice President. 86 An amendment
to restore the special election provisions of the first succession law was
defeated in the House.87 In spite of this evidence that a special election
was not contemplated under the law of I 88 6, it must be remembered that
the bill was amended to pacify those who wished to retain the provisions
for a special election.
The commentators have not agreed on whether a special election
could be called under the law or not. Tucker said, if the disability of
the President or Vice President were temporary, the prior-entitled individual was to be restored to his presidential powers, but, if it were a case
of vacancy or permanent inability, an election was to be called.88 Cooley,
Black, and Watson, on the other hand, said the acting President was to
serve until the disability of the President or Vice President was removed
or a President was elected at the next quadrennial election.89
The act of I 886 did nothing to resolve the question of Congressional
power to call a special election. Instead of providing that the acting
President serve until a President was elected at the next quadrennial
election or until a President was chosen by special election, the law
adopted the vague language of the Constitution, "until a President shall
be elected." The result of this uncertainty was probably to place the
tenure of the acting President in the hands of Congress. If Congress were
satisfied with the acting President, probably no special election would be
ordered; but, if he faced a hostile Congress, such an election might be
called. 90 Whatever criticisms may be made of the Presidential Succession Act of I 947, it has the merit of removing the uncertainty as to the
tenure of the acting President.
8

"Id. 1011.
17 CoNG. REc. 180 (1885).
86
Id. 665 (1886); H. REP. 26, 49th Cong., 1st sess., p. 4 (1886).
87
17 CONG. REC. 678-679, 693 (1886).
88
2 TucKER, THE CoNSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 714 (1899).
89
CooLEY, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3d ed. by McLaughlin, 52,
note 5 (1898); BLACK, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 90 (1895);
I WATSON, THE CoNSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 900-902 (1910).
9
For a criticism of this aspect of the act of 1886, see Hamlin, "The Presidential
Succession Act of 1886," 18 HARV. L. REv. 182 at 188-193 (1905); and 3 WILLOUGHBY, THE CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 2d ed., 1469 (1929).
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Constitutional authorities are by no means agreed on Congressional
power to provide for a special presidential election when the Presidency
and Vice Presidency are both vacant, but the preponderance of evidence
supports the power. The proceedings in the Philadelphia Convention
and in the Virginia Ratifying Convention, early interpretation of the
succession clause, and the opinion of a number of careful students of the
Constitution seems to support this power. If one accepts this position,
logic compels him to go a step further and hold that the officer designated
to act as President does not become the President. The power to call the
election precludes his claim to the tenure guaranteed by the Constitution
to a de jure President. Since there has never been a case of succession
beyond the Vice President, no conflicting usage has been established. To
say that Congress has the power to provide for a special election is not to
say that the exercise of this power is mandatory. Like the other powers
of Congress, it is permissive. When the act of r 792 was passed, Congress
saw fit to enact special election provisions. When the acts of r886 and
r 947 were passed, Congress did not see fit to do so.
Having accepted the power of Congress to provide for a special
presidential election in case of vacancy in both the Presidency and Vice
Presidency, there is the further question as to the tenure of the speciallyelected President. Before r 945, opinion was almost unanimously in favor
of the constitutional necessity of a four-year term for the President so
chosen. In r856, Senator Butler, reporting for the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, said that a President selected at a special election must hold
office for a ·term of four years, since this is the only term known in the
Constitution for a President chosen by the electoral colleges. The committee denied that Congress had power to provide for the election of a
President who would hold office for the residue of any existing term.
The election held under this authority, said the committee, is like an
election to provide for an approaching regular vacancy.91 Butler's opinion
was almost unanimously accepted by the Congress until Mr. Truman
suggested another interpretation of the Constitution.92
The Truman plan and the Sumners bill, both of which conceded the
constitutional power to call a special election, provided that the person
91

S. Rep. 260, 34th Cong., l st sess., p. 5 ( l 8 56) .
See the remarks of George Boutwell, CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d sess., 691
(1867); Murphy, 13 CoNG. REc. 126 (1881); Eden and Dibble, 17 CoNG. REc. 669,
685 (1886). See also H. REP. 26, 49th Cong., 1st sess., p. 5 (1886); H. REP. 3633,
58th Cong., 3d sess., p. l (1905); H. REP. 7581, 59th Cong., 2d sess., p. I (1907).
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so elected should serve for the unexpired portion of the term during
which the vacancy occurred. Since the special election was to concur with
the Congressional by-election, such a President would have a term of
two years. This part of the plan was stricken from the Sumners bill in
the House.03 When the matter was again discussed in the Eightieth
Congress, no serious attempt was made to provide for the filling of
vacancies by electing a President to serve for only two years. Senator
Wherry, sponsor of the bill which ultimately became the law, reverted to
the earlier position. He said that, if Congress has power to provide for
a special election, the President so elected must have a term of four
years. 94
Senator Wherry's conclusion on this point seems to be sound and
in accord with the letter of the Constitution and with previous Congressional opinion on the subject. It is adequately supported by the opinion
of able students of the Constitution. It is true that most writers on
presidential succession have ignored the question of the tenure of a
specially-elected President, but the few who have considered the problem
have generally concluded that such a President must have a term of four
years. 95
The argument that a specially-elected President need not have the
four-year tenure guaranteed by the Constitution because he would not
be the President but only the officer designated by Congress is untenable.
He would be the President, because the only election by presidential
electors known in the Constitution is the election of the President and
Vice President. "Officers of the United States" are appointed by the
President and the Senate, by the President alone, by the department
heads, or by the courts. Officers in the constitutional sense are not elected
by the electoral colleges. Thus, a person chosen by the electoral colleges
would not be an officer designated to act as President, but would be
the President and would have the four-year term provided in the
Constitution.
93
See the remarks of Hancock, Kefauver, Gwynne, and Springer on the constitutionality of electing a President for a term of two years. 91 CoNG. REc. 7015-7019
(1945).
0
"' 93 CoNG. REc. 7784 (1947).
95
2 BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 241
(1891); Works, "The Succession of the Vice-President Under the Constitution," 38
AM. L. REV. 500 at 503 (1904). See also two Oregon cases in support of this position:
State ex rel. Whitney v. Johns, 3 Ore. 533 at 538 (1870); State v. Olcott, 94 Ore. 633,
642, 187 P. 286 (1920). Tucker is alone among the commentators in taking the contrary
position, 2 TUCKER, THE CoNSTITUTION oF THE UNITED STATES 714 (1899).
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IV
CONCLUSION

The extent of Congressional power to provide for succession beyond
the Vice President depends largely on whether or not the succeeding
officer becomes the President. The preponderance of evidence and informed opinion favors the interpretation that the officer does not become
the President but merely acts in that capacity. From this it follows that
the acting President does not acquire the four-year presidential tenure,
and Congress can, therefore,provideforaspecial election to :fill the vacancy. Congressional power to provide for presidential succession, however,
is not without limitation, and Congress, in passing the Presidential Succession Act of 1947, has exceeded these limitations. Congress cannot
declare what person shall become President but can only annex presidential powers and duties to another office. Therefore, Congress cannot
authorize the officer to act as President after he ceases to be such officer
by relinquishing the office to which these powers and duties are appendant. Congress also exceeded its power in designating legislative
officers. Congress may designate only "officers of the United States," as
those officers are defined in the Constitution and by the courts, and the
Speaker of the House and President pro tempore of the Senate do not
fall within this definition.

